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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a writ of habeas corpus to 
discharge Sandra Cloud and her male baby from the 
custody and control of the defendants. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LU\VER COURT 
On August 23, 1967 the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court denied the petition o:l:' Sandra Cloud to be dis-
charged from the State Industrial School and to release 
and discharge her male baby; Court ordered the petition 
of habeas corpus for the baby taken under advisement 
until the juvenile court has ruled upon its hearing set 
in September. The Defense Counsels' to submit the 
order of the court to the court for signature. After 
juvenile court's decision writ to discharge baby was 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek to reverse the order of the 
District Court for Weber County, Utah and to have 
this court· order the discharge of both Sandra Cloud, 
and her baby, and place the baby in her care, control 
and custody, or in the alternative ti place the baby in 
the care, control and custody of its grandparents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah by G. L. 
Cloud, and Helen Cloud, his wife, and Sandra Cloud, 
their daughter, for a writ of habeas corpus, discharging 
Sandra Cloud, a minor of 16 years, and her baby, which 
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had been born to her in the Dee Memorial Hospital 
in Ogden, Utah on the 21st day of June, 1967 (R 16-
Page 18.) The writ was signed by Marcellu.s K. Snow, 
one of the Judges of the District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Utah, on the 6th day of July, 1967 (R-Page 
unnumbered (follows, in R. supplemental petition in 
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County under District 
Court No. 173326.) This writ was served upon def end-
ants on July 10, 1967. A motion for a change of Venue 
from the District Court for Salt Lake County to the 
District Court for Weber County was granted. Motion 
to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiffs G. L. Cloud 
and Helen Cloud was denied by Judge Snow. After 
it had been discovered that the baby had been placed 
in the custody of the Children's Aid Society a com-
plaint for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the 
District Court for Weber County of August 7, 1967 
against Rex Ashdown, the director of said Society. The 
writ was signed by Judge John F. Wahlquist on August 
7, 1967 and served upon the defendant the following 
day. (R 7). A hearing was held on the complaints 
for the writs on August 16, 1967, but continued until 
August 23, 1967 (R 8) on which day a further hearing 
was held at which time the Court entered the order 
appealed from. 
Sandra Cloud became pregnant outside of wedlock 
and her parents took her to Judge Garff' s Juvenile 
Court. There she was given a hearing and an order 
commiting her to the State Industrial School, but sus-
pended on condition that she go voluntarily to the State 
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Hospital in Provo, Utah, which she did, but after a 
four month's stay at the hospital she left the State 
Hospital and Judge Garff committed her to the State 
Industrial School at Ogden. 
A hearing was pending in the Juvenile Court in 
Ogden, to have the baby placed for adoption. 
District Court cases for a writ of habeas corpus 
against E. S. Ziegler et al. was filed in the District 
Court for 'Veber County, Utah under Case No. 46885 
and against Rex Ashdown, Director of the Children's 
Aid Society at Ogden, under Case No. 46888. 
The foregoing numbered cases were consolidated 
and heard by the court simultaneously on August 23, 
1967, upon complaints of 'Vrits of Habeas Corpus, 
and at the end of the hearing, the court denied the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus involving the custody and com-
mitment of Sandra Cloud to the Industrial School of 
Utah, but continued the case involving the custody and 
jurisdiction of Baby Boy Cloud until after the hearing 
in the Juvenile Court. That hearing was held on Tues-
day, the 21st day of November, 1967, in which the 
Judge of said Juvenile Court found that the allegations 
of the petition to be true, and placed said baby in charge 
of the State ',y elf are Department for placement for 
his adoption and terminating the parental rights of 
Sandra Cloud, his mother. 
The Court found relative to the complaint for 
Habeas Corpus of Baby Cloud that he was not held 
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unlawfully by the State Welfare Department or by 
Hex Ashdown as the Director of the Children's Aid 
Society, and the writ of Habeas Corpus for release 
of the ~aid baby to his mother, Sandra Cloud, or to his 
grandparents, G. L. Cloud and Helen Cloud, was 
denied. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concluded as a matter of law that the '¥rit of Habeas 
Corpus releasing Baby Boy Cloud from custody afore-
said should be denied. 
Judge Ziegler's Juvenile Court Decree was :filed 
December 13, 1967, and appealed from to this court 
where the matter can be heard,the court permitting, 
simultaneously with the writs of habeas corpus cases. 
The Decree provided as follows: 
"It is therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed: 
I. That the above named child (Baby Boy Cloud) 
is hereby adjudicated within section 77 of the Ju-
venile Court Act of 1965. 
2. That he be and is hereby placed in the legal 
custody and guardianship of the Children's Aid 
Society of Utah for the purpose of adoption and 
that all of the parental rights to said child be and 
are hereby terminated. 
3. That this case be and is hereby set for review 
ont he 26th day of May, 1969. 
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First District Juvenile Court 
Dated this 21st day of November 1967 
By the Court 
E. S. Ziegler 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FAILURE TO INFORM THE APPEL-
LANT, SANDRA CLOUD, THAT SHE WAS 
ENTITLED TO THE SERVICES OF AN AT-
TORNEY IN THE PROCEEDING IN THE 
2ND DISTRICT, JUVENILE COURT, WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Although the court found that she had the advice 
and counsel of an attorney in the 2nd District Juvenile 
Court, she testified that the counsel was hired for her 
father and mother, and she had no advice from an 
attorney. (See Form 13B containing findings of fact 
and decree of the Ogden Juvenile Court.) (See also 
Sandra Cloud's testimony before Judge Wahlquist.) 
See Tr. 4 & 10, 14, 15, 16, see lines 16 & 17). 
Sandra, while before Judge Garff, was not told 
that she had a right to be confronted by witnesses 
and the right to have them cross examined or the right 
to counsel for herself and a right to notice of the hear-
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ings, that she could keep silent if she wished, or what 
she might state to any officer taking her into custody, 
coud be used against her at the hearing. See Tr. 10. 
The following was asked Sandra Cloud: 
"The court: Did anybody explain Sandra's rights 
at that hearing? 
Mr. 1\!Iarsden: They tell me no. Is that correct, 
Sandra? 
Sandra Cloud: Yes." (Lines 18, 20 and 21, Tr. 10). 
These questions refer to the hearing before Judge Garff 
after Sandra was brought from the hospital at Provo 
to the Juvenile Detention Home in Salt Lake County, 
Tr. 14 and 15). 
Sandra Cloud relies on the case of: In The 
Matter of Gault, 18 L. Ed. 2nd 527 (1967), for dis-
charging her from the State Industrial School and 
her baby from the custody of the Children's Aid So-
ciety. In the case at bar, Sandra Claud was commit-
ted to said school at the age of 16. The procedure 
used in Juvenile Courts had never been examined 
under the United States Constitution. The Gault deci-
sion had a revolutionary effect on the law applicable to 
delinquent children by determining that in all "fact 
finding" hearings (hearings in whcih it is determined 
what the child has done and in which determination of 
delinquency is made which may result in a commitment 
of the child to an institution) the child must be given 
all the essentials of due process and fair treatment. 
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The facts of the Gault case are fairly simple: 111 
June, 1964, fifteen-year-old Gerald Francis Gault 
allegedly telephoned .Mrs. Cook, a neighbor of the 
Gault family in Gila County, Arizona, and made lewd 
or indecent remarks to her. He was adjudicated a delin· 
quent in Juvenile court and ordered committed to the 
State Industrial School for boys "For the period of his 
minority" (until age 21) "unless sooner discharged by 
due process of law". The factual issue before the Ari-
zona Court was whether Gerald Gault in company of 
another teenager made obscene remarks by phone to 
Mrs. Cook. The case was resolved by the Arizona court 
without furnishing in writing the charges against Gerald 
to him or his parents, without determining if Gerald 
wanted counsel, without bringing the accusing wit-
nesses into the hearing, without advising the juvenile 
of his right to remain silent, without a transcript, and 
without a right to appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court 
found that petitioners were not denied due process of 
law. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed 
that decision. 
The Gault case is somewhat more spectacular as 
an example of abuse of the right of a juvenile offender 
than the case at bar. The following factors are com· 
parable between the cases. 
In the Gault case the erring juvenile was fifteen 
years of age when the offense was committed. In the 
case at bar the juvenile offender was sixteen years of 
age. 
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2. In both cases the child was adjudicated without 
determining if he wanted counsel, without bringing the 
accusing witness or witnesses into the hearings, without 
advising the juvenile of his right to remain silent, with-
out submitting evidence swearing any witnesses and 
without counsel specifically as her counsel. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Case Law on Right to Courusel: 
The standard as established in the Gault case with 
regard to the right of a juvenile and his parents to be 
represented by Counsel is that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause * * * 
" ... requires that in respect of proceedings to 
determine delinquency which may result in commitment 
to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is cur-
tailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the 
child's rights to be represented by counsel retained by 
them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that coun-
sel will be appointed to represent the child." (Emphasis 
added.) 18 L.Ed. 2nd at 554. 
The clear holding of the court is that not only must 
the child and his parents be notified of the child's right 
to be represented by counsel of their choosing, but if 
they are unable to afford counsel the court must inform 
them of their right to have appointed counsel. It is 
important to note that the court has an affirmative duty 
to inform the juvenile and his parents of their right to 
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counsel. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 ( 1962). 
Therefore, the court fails to so advise both the child 
and parents, and proceeds with the hearing, the adjudi-
cation of delinquency and the order of commitment in 
the absenceof counsel for the child and his parents or 
an express waiver of the right by both parties to the 
constitutional rights of the child under the due process 
clause will have been violated and the court proceedings 
fatally defective. 
The court in the Gault case made it clear that 
neither the judge nor the probation officer is in a posi· 
tion to act as counsel for the child. The court stated 
that "there is no material difference in this respect 
between adult and juvenile proceedings, this contention 
has been foreclosed by decisoins of this court. 
Powell v. Alaba?na, 287 U.S. 45, 61, 77 L.Ed. 158, 
166, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792; 18 L.Ed 2d at 551. 
The court further stated at page 551: 
"A proceeding where the issue is whether the 
child will be found to be delinquent and subject 
to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable 
in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juve-
nile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with 
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the 
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceed-
ings, and to ascertain whether he has a def e.nse 
and to prepare and submit it. The child reqwres 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
prceedings." 
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The court also stated at page 551: 
" ... we hold that it (the assistance of counsel) 
is . . . essential for the determination of delin-
quency, carrying with it the awesome prospects 
of incarceration in a state institution until the 
juvenile reaches the age of 21." 
In conclusion,t he court observes at page 554: 
"We conclude that the due process clause of 
the 14th Amendment requires that in respect of 
proceedings to determine delinquency which may 
result in the commitment to an institution in 
which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the 
child and his parents must be notified of the 
child's rights to be represented by counsel re-
tained by them or if they are unable to afford 
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to repre-
sent the child." 
Utah Statutory Law on Right to Council. 
The holding of the Supreme Court in the Gault 
case with regard to counsel could not have come as too 
great a shock to the Juvenile Court System of Utah. 
Section 55-10-96 of the Utah Juvenile Court Act pro~ 
vides: 
"Parents, guardian, the child's custodians, and 
the child, if old enough, shall be informed that 
they have the right to be represented by counsel 
at every stage of the proceedings. They have the 
right to employ counsel of their own choosin&"; 
and if any of them request an attorney and is 
found by the court to be without sufficient finan-
cial me~ns to employ an attorney, counsel shall 
be appointed by the court." 
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The Utah statute limits the duty of a court to inform 
the child of his right to be represented by counsel to 
those children only who are "old enough." Gault place~ 
no such limitation on such a fundamental right as this. 
Both child and parents, according to Gault, have the 
absolute right to be informed of their rights in this 
regard. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Gault puts an 
absolute duty upon the court to inform the juvenile 
and his parent, if they are indigent, of their right to 
have the court appoint an attorney to represent them 
free of charge. Contrary to the Utah statute, the right 
of the child and his parents in this regard is in full effect 
whether they request an attorney or not. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT OF THE FIRST 
DISTRICT IN OGDEN WAS WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY TO PLACE BABY BOY CLOUD 
OUT FOR ADOPTION. 
How can Sandra Cloud be charged with delin· 
quency or neglect of her child when she has never had 
its custody from the date of its birth on June 21, 1967 
at the Dee Hospital, but only saw the baby for 5 or 
10 minutes after its birth? (Tr. 18). Sandra Cloud 
has never had an opportunity to demonstrate her capa· 
bilities in caring for her child, since she was an inmate 
of the Industrial School. "\Vhether the baby is a de-
pendent child cannot be determined until she has been 
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granted the care, charge and custody of the baby. We 
think, therefore, that the Juvenile Court at Ogden had 
no power or authority to place the baby out for adoption 
in custody of the Children's Aid Society of Utah. See 
decree on Form 13B of the Juvenile Court filed De-
cember 13, 1967. 
The Juvenile Courts of Utah have exclusive 
original jurisdiction over persons under 18 years of 
age who are either delinquent, dependent or neglected, 
except in felony cases. Baby Boy Cloud falls in none 
of these categories until his mother has been given his 
custody and demonstrates that the baby has become 
dependent or neglected by her lack of proper maternal 
care. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 55-10-5. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the order of the 
District Court for Weber County, Utah, should be re-
rersed denying the plaintiffs the right of habeas corpus 
in this matter and discharge Sandra Cloud from the 
State Industrial School and her baby from the custody 
of the Children's Aid Society of Utah and that the 
Decree of the First Juvenile District Court of Utah, 
placing the baby in the custody of the Children's Aid 
Society for adoption be declared null and void and 
that the baby be given to his mother or in the alternative 
to his grandparents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. M. MARSDEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
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